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READING BURKE'S RHETORIC
George McElroy

"is the business of the speculative philosoher to mafk
T^^the proper end of Government. It is the business of the
politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out
proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with
effect."^ Burke, the archetypical philosopher in action, had, as
his primary means, spoken and written rhetoric, employed with
effect. This rhetoric, like that of any political figure with real
ideas, is thus the intersection of philosophy with history. The
ideas are applied to a particular historical situation and problem.
The rhetorician uses only those pertinent to that issue and most
likely to be assented to by the intended audience, colored and
phrased to make them both more acceptable and more forceful,
for he must stir men's feelings along with their ideas. Similarly,
supporting facts are selected, the useful ones colored to make
them more striking, those less convenient glossed over or
' Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (hereafter, Discontents) in The
Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981) U, 317. All further references to those of Burke's works which are in
those volumes of the new Oxford edition that have appeared as of this writing
(vols, n, V, VI, Vni, IX) are to this edition, abbreviated W&S. References to
other Burke works are to The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, 9th
edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1889), abbreviated Works, except for A Philosophical
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (see n5).
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ignored. Details may be twisted to make them better suit the
purpose. Diction is chosen more for impact than for precision.
Any philosopher or historian can find fault. But if, as with
Burke, we believe that significant thinking underlies his rhetoric
(if only because history so often proved him right), we need to
see what rhetorical licenses he does and does not allow himself,
as well as what rhetorical necessities he faced in each work we
look at, to sort out his fundamental ideas from their compara
tively accidental coloring, as well as to see what is and is not
useful criticism.
Deviation from fact can be a rhetorical necessity. Historians
deride the "myth" of King and government acting under the
"influence" of Lord Bute or an "inner cabinet," propounded by
the political Opposition of the 1760s and 177Gs.
But
Opposition was attacking the policies of the King, while
protocol precluded any direct criticism of the monarch. If such
"advisers" did not exist, they had to be invented, consciously or
self-deceptively. It is often sensible to read "King" where one
finds "Bute," "Court Faction," or "inner cabinet."^
Additionally, Burke took standard rhetorical licenses. He
did not despise "Grand swelling sentiments of liberty": "they
warm the heart; they enlarge and liberate our minds; they
animate our courage in time of conflict," though they prove
nothing—"A commonplace in favor of slavery and tyranny
^ In Discontents Burke dutifully professes to exonerate George HI: the "singular
advantages" with which his reign began "inspired his Majesty only with a more
ardent desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom to which
he owed a situation so full of glory. But to others it suggested sentiments of a
very different nature. They thought they now beheld an opportunity...of drawing
to themselves, by the aggrandizement of a Court Faction, a degree of power which
they could never hope to derive from natural influence or from honourable
service." W&S U, 163. But Burke noted, on the margin of his Taxation speech's
description of Chatham's chequered, incoherent cabinet, "He did all this to please
the King which was easy to him from his contempt of Mankind." Ibid. 450n.
Chatham's attempt at a non-partisan administration was the prime attempt to
realize that system of the "Court Faaion" Burke decried in Discontents. So, to
Burke, it was the King's system, but he could not say so publicly.
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delivered to a popular assembly, would indeed be a bold
defiance to all the principles of rhetoric."^ But when he feared
pseans to French Revolutionary "liberty" might produce
disaster, he countered with his own swelling sentiments about
church, king, country, and Marie Antoinette/ He meant to
produce (or avert) action, and—by definition—emotion moves
us to act. He had noted, in his Sublime and Beautiful, that a
string of chained words could raise emotion, even if applied to
nothing at all,' and he was never for rhetorical half-measures.
All his comparatives come out as superlatives; almost every
session of Parliament produced at least one ministerial proposal
"the most flagitious" ever attempted, hitherto "unheard of" in
civilized countries.
But he generally evoked feeling by vividly detailed specifics,
in plain language. To repeal the Stamp Act, the Rockingham
administration had brought in a mass of testimony from
merchants, "necessary for the detail, and to bring the matter
home to the feelings of the House; as to the general reasons,
they spoke abundantly for themselves."^ In 1791, Burke asked
for details of actual dealings between French peasants and noble
^ An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (hereafter, Appeal), Works IV, 77.
James T. Boulton, in his perceptive discussion of Burke's rhetorical style and
strategy in Reflections on the Revolution in France, argues persuasively that the
apostrophe to the Queen "is central to the work as a whole. At the risk of being
censured by some for excessive emotionalism. Burke provides a memorable
centrepiece which, in symbolic terms, focuses the philosophical significance of all
that goes before it and acts as a seminal passage for what follows." The Language
of Politics in the Age of Wilkes and Burke (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963)
132-33.
' A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful,
ed. J. T. Boulton (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), Part V, especially
Section III "General words before IDEAS," 165-66.
' Observations on a Late State of the Nation (hereafter. Late State), W&S 11, 198.
This pamphlet is, according to my stylometric analysis (see the appendix to my
"Edmund, William, and Richard Burke's First Attack on Indian Misrule, 1778,"
Bodleian Library Record, Fall, 1988, 62-65) a collaboration; William Dowdeswell
wrote the core attack on Grenvillian economics and arithmetic; Burke added a
beginning and a long ending, with two-page contributions each from Richard and
William Burke. This quotation is in Edmund's portion.
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landlords: "A general state of sufferings seldom touch peoples
minds. They are affected with particulars."^ He wrote his son
that a proposed manifesto by the emigre French princes should
be accompanied by "strong collections of cases and facts of
cruelties, persecutions and desolations produced by the
Revolution in a popular style which for being simple and
popular will not be the less eloquent and impressive....Par
ticulars make an impression."' He grumbled at William Eden's
writing of peace with "France" instead of saying "Jacobins" or
naming the obnoxious leaders to be treated with: "abstractions,
personifications, and impersonals" are often "the first of all
soporifics."'
Conversely, to avoid un-wanted feelings. Burke could be
purposefully vague. The Colonies' population, aside from two
million "of our own European blood and color" included "at
least 500,000 others, who form no inconsiderable part of the
strength and opulence of the whole."'° That's nicer than saying
"slaves." When he was trying to make Parliament think of
India's natives as real people, they were diversified, among other
things, by "hereditary employment."" Less alien-sounding than
"caste."
What he did not want to emphasize could almost escape
detection. In denouncing Price's assertion that, by the Glorious
Revolution, England had won the right to choose its monarchs
and cashier them for misconduct. Burke meant to insist that an
English revolution was unthinkable except in such another
necessity as that of 1689. But he thought it dangerous and
' To the Vicomte de CicL 24 Jan. 1791. The Correspondance of Edmund Burke
(hereafter, Corr.) VI, ed. Alfred Cobban and Robert A. Smith (Chicago, University
of Chicago Press,1967), 207.
* 18 August 1791; ibid., 359.
' 4th (actually, first) "Letter on a Regicide Peace," VE&S IX, 50.
Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies, March 22,
1775 (hereafter. Conciliation), Works II, 109.
" Mr. Burke's Speech, on the 1st December 1783, upon the Question for the Speaker's
leaving the Chair, for the House to resolve itself into a Committee on Mr. Fox's East
India Bill (hereafter, India Bill), W&S VIII, 390.
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useless to get the people debating what would justify revolution,
so he merely quoted Parliament's pledge of fealty to William
and Mary's line "for themselves, their heirs and posterities for
ever," relegating the possible exception to a subordinate clause:
"and whilst the legal conditions of the compact of sovereignty
are performed by him [Geoige III] as they are performed, he
holds his crown in contempt of the Revolution Society.'"^
From Tom Paine to L. G. Mitchell, editor of Reflections for
the new Oxford edition, critics have too often missed that
exception and accused Burke of asserting that, after 1690, all
English posterity was bound to unconditional subjection."
Burke would have thought that absurd. He came out strongly
for the right of revolution against tyranny, in opening the
Hastings impeachment:
by "the primseval indefeasible,
inalterable Law of Nature and of Nations" despotism,
controlled by no magistracy and not limited by the ruler's own
moderation, must be limited by "a rebellion divested of all its
criminal qualities";" indeed, "nothing but absolute impotence
Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies
in London Relative to that Event. In a Letter Intended to have been sent to a
Gentleman in Paris (hereafter, Reflections), W&S Vm, 65, 70. Careful readers might
have noted that the clause in Parliament's declaration, suhmitting "themselves, their
heirs and posterities for ever" to William and Mary and their heirs is. Burke points
out, copied from an act of Queen Elizabeth—and this Parliament had just, from
"necessity," as Burke contends, dethroned Elizabeth's heir and varied from the line
of succession. Obviously, the new pledge could be no more unconditional than
had been the old one.
" Mitchell implies this in several footnotes, e.g., to Burke's assertion that accepting
William as King "was not properly a choice;...it was an act of necessity, in the
strictest moral sense in which necessity can be taken," Mitchell notes "Burke's
argument here becomes somewhat tenuous. If 'necessity' had required a 'temporary
deviation' from the strict rules of succession once, why should it not do so again?
Equally, what is the nature of the'strict moral sense' which justifies such a
deviation and how does it differ from choice or election?" W&S V, 68-69.
Answer: another such necessity certainly would justify another "deviation," but
necessities are not definable by any general principle. They are—by definition—ex
ceptional. That is how they differ from "choice."
" Speech on opening the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, 2nd Day (16 Feb.,
1788), W&S VI, p. 470. This is an alternate version, in Burke's hand, for a passage
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can justify men in not resisting it to the best of their power', or
(alternatively) "it is a crime to bear it [unchecked despotism]
when it can be rationally shaken."^' ("Rational," for Burke,
always means feasible, or at least possible.) He trusted no such
necessity would again strike England, but when one occurs
everyone knows it, and knows that immediate action, not
debate, is demanded.'^ Short of that, discussion of revolution
is pointless and dangerous: "As it was not made for common
abuses, so it is not to be agitated by common minds." Each
necessity is unique, not definable by general principles, and,
rhetorically speaking, 1791 was a poor time to re-argue Locke's
Second Treatise, though Burke took its conclusions for
granted,and unhesitatingly invoked them when needed, to
justify rebellion in India against Hastings' arbitrary tyranny.
No rhetorician puts all his principles into any one argument.
Burke could vary literal fact when he needed support for a
general point he believed true. The late Prof. C. C. Davies told
me, long ago, that an exercise for Oxford students of Oriental
history was to find errors in Burke's India Bill speech. They
in the shorthand report.
" Ibid. 351; 462. The first is the shorthand report; the second, Burke's own
paragraph.
" Reflections, W&S Vm, 47.
" Ibid. 80.
" Society, Burke insists, was made to protect men's natural rights: "Everybody is
satisfied that a conservation and secure enjoyment of our natural rights is the great
and ultimate purpose of civil society, and that therefore all forms whatsoever of
Government are only good as they are subservient to that purpose." Fragments
of a Tract on the Popery Laws, Works VI, 333. Defending his India Bill, charged
with violating chartered rights. Burke admitted "The rights of men, that is to say
the natural rights of mankind, are indeed sacred things;" more so, if confirmed by
charter. But the Company's charter was entirely different: a grant of power and
monopoly, and all such "being wholly artificial, and for so much a derogation from
the natural equahty of mankind at large, ought to be some way or other exercised
ultimately for their benefit," and so be held accountable, and abohshed if they
clearly were not so used. India Bill, W&S V, 385. "To take away from men their
lives, their hberty, or their property, those things for the protection of which
society was introduced, is great hardship and intolerable tyranny." Speech on the
Acts of Uniformity, February 6, 1772. Works VH, 15.
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probably found several. For one, referring to the impoverished
Bombay presidency's failed attempt to make Maharashtra their
puppet state, on the Bengal model, by sending their army to
reinstate a deposed Maratha Peshwa (hereditary prime minister
and actual ruler). Burke said "the whole army of the Company
was obliged, in effect, to surrender to this injured, betrayed and
insulted people.'"^ But the defeated Bombay force was much
smaller than the intact armies of the Bengal and Madras
presidencies.
Similarly, Burke can enlarge singles into plurals. Dealing
with dependent states, "The invariable course of the Company's
policy is this: Either they set up some prince too odious to
maintain himself without the necessity of their assistance; or
they soon render him odious by making him the instrument of
their government." The first case is that of the Nabob of
Arcot, at Madras; the second, of the Nabob of Oudh, up-river
from Bengal, each (at the time) unique. In the second case, said
Burke, people are so driven to rebellion the army becomes vital,
insists on its share of the loot, and has tracts delivered to it:
"Then it is found proper to convert their commanding officers
into farmers of revenue." This alludes to Col. Alexander
Hannay, a Hastings protege who "farmed" a sizable district in
Oudh. But in an interview with the deceased Colonel's
brother, attested by Sir Gilbert Elliot, Burke said that Hannay
was the only commander who had been a revenue farmer.^"
Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, had
blunderingly authorized Bombay's Maharashtra invasion while
preparing for a different invasion of his own. Though his
schemes aborted, he persisted in fighting the Marathas, hoping
for great conquests. Consequently, they made peace and an
anti-English alliance with their old enemy, Haidar Ali of
Mysore, who then ravaged the Madras protectorate. Reluc" India Bill, W&S V, 396.
Ms. note of the interview, Fitzwilliam Muniments, Sheffield Public Library,
Bk.9b. During the Hastings trial, it developed that some of Hannay's subordinate
officers had been under-farmers to him, but they were not "commanding officers."
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tantly, Hastings decided he must make peace with the Marathas,
but he wanted to go on with the war against Haidar until he
was obliterated. He instructed his envoy to the Marathas, said
Burke, to include in the treaty only a'Vague article" in favor of
their ally. Burke's own ms. notes show the phrase was in a
letter from the envoy to Hastings, not vice versa.^' But the
policy was indeed that of Hastings.
That is, if the cases cited are exaggerated or slightly
inaccurate, they were selected from many more, all establishing
Burke's point: that the Company's government gave great,
inadequately checked power to young men who went to India
only to make fortunes as fast as possible, so that abuse would
be inevitable until checks on that power were effective. The
proper historical question is, was this actually the case.^—not,
were these details accurate.^ Burke made them forceful because,
even in a long speech, he could hardly unload on the House the
whole appendix to his 9th Report.
When, conversely, facts were inconvenient. Burke could
ignore them rather than get into complicated digressions. The
Declaration des Droits de VHomme et du Citoyen asserted "La
Souverainete est une indivisible, inalienable, et imprescript
ible-.—Elle appartient a la Nation." Burke insisted "that no such
doctrine has ever been heard of in any publick act of any
Government whatsoever.
Excoriating the new French
constitution's lack of religion, Burke maintained that "All other
nations have begun the fabric of a new government, or the
reformation of an old, by establishing originally, or by
enforcing with greater exactness some rites or other of
religion."^^ He surely knew that the American Constitution,
commencing, "We, the people..." had been in operation for two
years before he wrote Reflections, and that the Bill of Rights,
the first sentence of which forbade establishment of religion.
" Ibid.
^ "Observations on the Conduct of the Minority, in the Session of 1793." W&S
Vm, 438.
" Reflections, ibid. 88.
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was in process of ratification. But few of his readers (even
Fitzwilliam and Portland) would know, and explaining why, or
whether the United States could safely be different would
complicate and dilute his arguments.
Complex matters might need simplification to be effective.
Haidar's devastating attack, in 1780, on the Nabob of Arcot's
dominions, the Madras protectorate, destroying a British force,
had finally jerked Parliament's attention back from America to
India. For years, naming it was the likeliest way to get their
ear for any Indian problem. So in Burke's 1783 India Bill
speech, arguing for nationalization of the incorrigible India
Company, Burke blamed the Madras disaster on the Company's
"insatiable lust of plunder."^"* In his 1785 speech on the Nabob
of Arcot's debts, the Nabob's Madras creditors brought on
Haidar's vengeance.^^ In the Hastings impeachment, Haidar's
union with the Marathas and invasion of the Carnatic was
Hastings's "own work, the consequences of his bad faith, and
his not listening to any reasonable terms of peace.
This is simplification, not contradiction. All were involved.
Madras, dominated by the Nabob's creditors, had earned
Haidar's enmity, but he was preoccupied by his war with the
Marathas. Hastings's aggression against them forced them to
make peace and alliance with Haidar, freeing him to attack
Madras. And Hastings had remained Governor-General, despite
well-grounded attacks on his policies and methods, because the
Company's Proprietors expected he would, one way or another,
make money for them. Burke had also, when the news of the
invasion first arrived, rightly blamed North's administration for
"the eastern politics, adopted by the Company under the
Baneful influence and direction of Government."^^ But after
W&S V, 396.
Speech, on the Motion Made for Papers relative to the Directions for Charging the
Nabob of Arcot's Private Debts to Europeans on the Revenues of the Camatic
(February 28th, 1785), ibid. 518-19.
Speeches in GenertJ Reply, 9th Day, Works XII, 383-85.
Unsigned back-page letter in The London Courant, March 31, 1781. My
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North's coalition with his party Burke felt honour-bound not
to call up his mistakes "without necessity."^^ To find what
Burke thought caused Haidar's invasion, combine all four
versions.
Principles as well as facts may need combining. On the
alleged inconsistency between his earlier writings and Reflec
tions, Burke expostulated that anyone anxious to preserve the
balance among the British constitution's three members must,
when one was attacked, "vindicate the three several parts on the
several principles peculiarly belonging to theni. He cannot
assert the democratic part on the principles on which monarchy
is supported, nor can he support monarchy on the principles of
democracy, nor can he maintain aristocracy on the grounds of
the one or of the other or of both."^' That is, in Discontents he
had charged that the rubber-stamp Commons was losing its
function as a control on the executive. In Reflections he
contended that the enfeebled French Monarch could be no
check on whatever the legislature chose to do. Put these
together, and Burke's basic principle is clear and consistent: no
man, and no body of men, can safely be trusted with un
checked power. A good constitution must supply the needed
checks.
I suspect that even Pocock may have been trapped into
finding a change in Burke's thinking that is, at least, dubious.
Pocock notes that in the young Burke's aborted project for a
history of English law, he derided the common legal assump
tions that English law was of almost boundless antiquity and
purely English in its development. But Pocock asserts that
stylometric analysis shows this to be Burke's, perhaps his last newspaper letter.
It was indeed Administration interference that had sent the corrupt, inept
Rumbold-WhitehiU Council to Madras instead of such much better qualified men
as Claude Russell and Alexander Dalrymple, but that is too complex a story for
a footnote.
Fourth "Letter on a Regicide Peace," W&S DC, 64. This alludes to the American
war, but the principle applies to all North's pre-Coalition acts.
Appeal, Works IV, 93.
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Burke actually adopts those assumptions in Reflections when,
to deny the contention that the British constitution had
degenerated from its principles, he asked how the principles of
the constitution were to be known but from its construction—if
that is unchanged, so are the principles—and asserted "A
prescriptive government such as ours, never was the work of
any legislator, never was made upon any foregone theory."
This, says Pocock, is a reversion "to the position he formerly
rebuked Hale for adopting—that little or nothing can be known
of the history of an immemorial constitution save that there is
a great weight of presumption in its favour."^® But, aside from
the difference between a constitution and laws, to say that
neither developed from any set theory is not at all to say
nothing useful can be known about the way they did develop.
In Reflections Burke is frightened lest calls for change on the
basis of some theory might pull the English system to pieces, as
had happened in France;
consequently he emphasizes
everything making for continuity. But that does not necessarily
conflict with a belief, freely expressed in calmer times, that
there has been much change within this continuity, and that
understanding how it has come about could make the study of
law more rational. Again, putting both texts together produces
a more rounded picture of Burke's view of English law. A
rhetorician invokes different ideas on different occasions; it is
good sense to see whether they are not complementary before
pronouncing them contradictory.
Another lead to Burke's basic thinking is that in almost all
his works, he shifts the ground of argument from that of his
opponents to what he thinks pertinent. In 1769, he insisted
American policy could not be argued, Grenville's way, on
"abstract principles of government" or on England's constitu
tion, but only on the "actual constitution" of this new, singular
"Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A Problem in the History of Ideas," in
Politics Language and Time (University of Chicago Press [reprint], 1989) 222-29.
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object.^' He refuses to blame the "present discontents" on Lord
Bute, Opposition's standard bogey-man, but on a long-concerted
scheme to break up political parties.^^ In Conciliation he would
not debate Parliament's right to tax Colonies; "The question
with me is, not whether you have a right to render your people
miserable but whether it is not your interest to make them
happy.
Opponents of Fox's (essentially, Burke's) India Bill
had, he chained, declaimed about law, property-rights,
corporation franchises, or political advantages, topics belonging
"only to matters of the lowest and meanest litigation," but
nothing of whether the bill would serve the interests either of
the people of India or of Great Britain.^"^ In his Appeal from
the New to the Old Whigs he bewildered Paine by summarizing
his "Rights of Man" arguments and refusing to discuss them;
they were no more relevant to effective government than
arguments over taxation rights had been useful in holding an
empire together.
That is, for Burke, important questions were not about
personalities or particular actions, but about principles. Not
abstract philosophical theories or legal rights and forms, but of
cause and effect. And, as he repeatedly said, these were based
on human nature. It is what men think, feel, and want that
causes them to act—or refuse to act. Burke's ideas of human
nature are his most basic major premises, and little, if at all,
rhetorically distorted, but any one argument will invoke only
those useful for it; we have to hunt for others. I have argued
elsewhere that the study should begin with his one systematic
analysis, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of
the Sublime and Beautiful, that this shows him to be, intellectu
ally, a Scottish Enlightenment empiricist, and that he continued
so?^ But there is much more to do to reconstruct Burke's view
" Late State, W&S H, 193-94.
Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, W&S II, 275.
" Conciliation, Works II, 140.
" W&S V, 381-82.
" "Edmund Burke and the Scottish Enlightenment," Man and Nature XI, ed.
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of human nature. I would only ai^ue that any real understand
ing of Burke's ideas must start there.
Christa Fell and James Leith, (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Society for
Eighteenth-Century Studies, by Academic Prmting and Publishing, 1992) 171-85.

